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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
TAX REFORM ACT OF 1984 - NETHERLANDS ANTILLES - EF-
FECT OF THE REPEAL OF THE WITHHOLDING TAX ON PORTFOLIO
INTEREST PAYMENTS TO FOREIGN INVESTORS
As part of President Reagan's plan to reduce the burgeoning fed-
eral deficit,' Congress enacted the Tax Reform Act of 1984.' Sec-
tion 127 of this Act repealed the thirty percent withholding tax
imposed on "portfolio interest"3 earned by foreign persons4 from
United States sources. By passing section 127, Congress sought to
provide the United States Treasury, as well as domestic corporate
borrowers, direct access to cheaper capital available on the
Eurobond market.' In addition, Congress sought to increase net
revenues6 by eroding the appeal of the Netherlands Antilles as a
24 TAX NOTES 5 (July 2, 1984).
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
(98 Stat.) 494. This Act is divided into two parts, the Tax Reform Act of 1984 and the
Spending Reduction Act of 1984. Together they contain approximately $50 billion in reve-
nue increases and $11 billion in spending cuts. Id. at 6.
See I.R.C. § 871(h)(2) (CCH 1984). I.R.C. § 871(a) imposed a flat tax of 30% on interest
and dividends emanating from United States sources. The tax is to be paid on investment
portfolios held by nonresident aliens and foreign corporations (subject to reduction or ex-
emption by bilateral tax treaties), if such income is not effectively connected with the con-
duct of a trade or business in the United States. I.R.C. § 881 (CCH 1984). For specific rules
determining whether income is "effectively connected" with the United States, see Treas.
Reg. §§ 1.864-4 - 1.864-7. The tax is a "withholding tax" because the payor of the income
withholds a portion on behalf of the Internal Revenue Service. I.R.C. §§ 1441 - 1442 (CCH
1984).
' Foreign persons include nonresident alien individuals, foreign corporations, foreign
trusts, foreign partnerships, and foreign estates. See I.R.C. §§ 7701(a)(1), (4), (5) and (31)
(CCH 1985).
' The Eurobond market is a network of underwriters and financial institutions which
markets corporate and government bonds. These bonds are usually denominated in dollars
and sold in countries other than the United States. Francis, U.S. Tries to Stem Flow of U.S.
Tax Revenue Through Antilles 'Haven,' CHRISTIAN SCI. MON., Jan. 10, 1984, at 4, col. 1.
Eurobonds are issued in unregistered, "bearer" form with principal and interest payments
made directly to whoever presents the bonds for payment. Thus, the holder of the bond
remains anonymous, an arrangement which allows United States citizens as well as foreign-
ers to escape withholding. See Jackson, Antilles 'Firms' Help Many Evade Taxes, L.A.
Times, Apr. 12, 1983, § 1, at 6, col. 2.
' In the process, however, the Act forfeits more than $500 million in withholding tax.
Hamilton, Netherlands Antilles Declares War on Tax Proposal, Wash. Post, Apr. 22, 1984,
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popular haven for tax evasion.'
Enticed by liberal tax incentives provided by the United States-
Netherlands Antilles tax treaty,' over 200 United States corpora-
tions' established as many as 25,000 "paper" corporations in the
Antilles to escape withholding taxes.10 Under the treaty, these fi-
nancing subsidiaries borrowed from European investors unre-
strained by the imposition of the withholding tax on interest pay-
ments made to their investors.11 These subsidiaries in turn
reloaned their newly borrowed funds to their parent companies in
the United States."2 As a result, foreign investors accepted a lower
at G6, col. 1.
7 Id.; see generally The Antilles Connection, Wash. Post, May 28, 1984, at A18, col. 1.
For general information regarding the use of the Netherlands Antilles as a tax haven, see H.
Margolis, INTERNATIONAL TAX PLANNING 31-62 (J. McCord ed. 1982). The primary attraction
of the Antilles is the array of substantial tax breaks afforded Antillean residents who own
United States real estate. Id. at 35.
Two small island groups in the Caribbean Sea form the Netherlands Antilles. These is-
lands were Dutch colonial possessions until 1954, when they became part of the Kingdom of
the Netherlands. The "Leeward Islands" of Aruba, Bonaire, and Curacao lie slightly north-
west of Venezuela. The "Windward Islands" (St. Eustatius, St. Maarten, and Saba), lie to
the east of Puerto Rico. The capital city of Willemstad is located on Curacao, the financial
hub of the islands. The Antilles comprise a land area about one-third the size of Rhode
Island and host a population of 245,000.
8 Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and Certain Other Taxes, Apr. 29, 1948,
United States-Netherlands, 62 Stat. 1757, T.I.A.S. No. 1855, as amended, Protocol Supple-
menting the Convention for the Purpose of Facilitating Extension to the Netherlands Antil-
les, June 15, 1955, United States-Netherlands, 6 U.S.T. 3696, T.I.A.S. No. 3366, as ex-
tended, Convention on Double Taxation of Income, Extension to Netherlands Antilles of
Convention of Apr. 29, 1948, Nov. 10, 1955, United States-Netherlands, 6 U.S.T. 3703,
T.I.A.S. No. 3367, as amended, Protocol Modifying and Supplementing the Extension to the
Netherlands Antilles of the Convention of Apr. 29, 1948, Oct. 23, 1963, United States-
Netherlands, 15 U.S.T. 1900, T.I.A.S. No. 5665, as supplemented, Convention Modifying
and Supplementing the Convention of Apr. 29, 1948, Dec. 30, 1965, United States-Nether-
lands, 17 U.S.T. 896, T.I.A.S. No. 6061 [hereinafter cited as Convention].
9 Gerth, Antilles Fights U.S. Assertions: Debate Grows on Tax Havens, N.Y. Times, July
4, 1983, at 29, col. 3. Corporations with Antillean subsidiaries include Atlantic Richfield,
American Telephone & Telegraph, and Sears. Fialka, Closing a Loophole: Corporate Tax
Haven in Netherlands Antilles Is Bracing for a Disaster, Wall St. J., Oct. 11, 1982, at 17,
col. 1.
o Jackson, supra note 5.
" Convention, supra note 8, art. VIII; see Jackson, supra note 5.
In 1981, $1.37 billion of portfolio interest was paid in the Netherlands Antilles, of which
only $1.4 billion (1.5%) was withheld. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 98TH
CONG., 2D SEsS., DESCRIPTION OF TAX BILLS (S. 1066, S. 1550, S. 1557, and S. 1666) 30
(Comm. Print 1983).
12 The fact that net United States borrowing from affiliates in the Antilles jumped from
$1 billion to $16 billion in 1982 alone evidences the surging popularity of the Antilles as a
tax haven. Treasury Reports on Use of Caribbean Tax Havens, 22 TAX NOTEZ 165 (Jan. 1,
1984). For a recent ruling on inter-company loans by an Antilles finance subsidiary to its
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return in exchange for an avoidance of the withholding tax,' 3
United States corporations financed their domestic operations with
less expensive Eurobonds, 4 and the Netherlands Antilles reaped
substantial dividends from its nearly thirty-year-old treaty. 5 The
repeal of the tax, however, circumvents the need to channel funds
through the Antilles, seriously threatening the economic and politi-
cal stability of a group of islands which relies heavily on its status
as a tax haven.' 6 Tax Reform Act of 1984, contained in Deficit
Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 494.
The Tax Reform Act is not Congress' first attempt to control the
use of the Antilles as a conduit for tax evasion. The Foreign In-
vestment in United States Real Property Tax Act of 1980
(FIRPTA)'7 taxed gains realized by foreign investors on disposi-
tion of United States real property interests (USRPI). s Prior to
FIRPTA, Antillean residents who invested in United States real
estate received preferential tax treatment because they paid no
Antillean tax on income derived from their property. Moreover, all
nonresident aliens not engaged in a trade or business in the United
States paid no United States capital gains tax upon disposition of
USRPI. 19
United States operating affiliate, see Rev. Rul. 84-152. The Service held that, barring a legit-
imate business or economic objective, if (1) a foreign parent wholly owns both companies,
and (2) the common foreign parent lends funds to the subsidiary which subsequently lends
the funds to the United States company, the subsidiary will be deemed merely a conduit for
interest payments by the United States company to the common parent. As a result, the
Service will withhold tax at a rate applicable to residents of the common parent's country.
" According to one Wall Street estimate, American corporations have saved as much as
$100 million by selling Eurobonds through Antillean subsidiaries. Francis, supra note 5, at
5, col. 3. Even though foreign investors often accept a lower initial return than American
investors, many still earn a higher net return because they escape United States estate taxes
by operating through what has been dubbed "the Antillean window." Fialka, supra note 9,
at 1, col. 6.
"4 See Fialka, supra note 9, at 1, col. 6.
"6 The Antilles receives more than $50 million per year in income taxes related to its
international finance activities. Id. col. 1.
"e Harold Henriquez, former tax commissioner of the islands, warned that repeal of the
withholding tax could trigger social unrest, political instability, and perhaps even an over-
throw of the government by groups with "leftist sympathies." Id.
" Pub. L. No. 96-499, §§ 1121-1125, 94 Stat. 2599, 2682 (codified at I.R.C. §§ 861(a)(5),
897, 6039(c), 6252(g) (1980)).
"8 See id. § 1122(c) (codified in I.R.C. § 897) (CCH 1985); see generally Maiers, New Tax
Withholding Rules For Foreign-Owned United States Real Estate, Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L.,
this issue.
t" See Margolis, supra note 7, at § 3.24, which sets forth a detailed analysis of FIRPTA-
evasion schemes.
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During the four years following its enactment, the extent of
FIRPTA's enforceability has remained a controversial topic.2" As a
result of this uncertainty, the Tax Reform Act of 1984 replaced the
system of voluntary information reporting originally implemented
to enforce FIRPTA2' with a more effective withholding tax.22
The Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) is another example of con-
gressional attention affecting the economic status of the Nether-
lands Antilles.23 President Reagan proposed the CBI in 1983 to
stimulate investment and trade activity in developing countries in
the Caribbean, Central America, and South America.2 4 Rooted in
the belief that a strong economy promotes a strong defense against
political change,2 5 the CBI allows the duty free export of certain
items into Caribbean countries,2" provides tax incentives for
11 FIRPTA was subjected to substantial redrafting during a process which included con-
ference discussion (1980), statutory amendments in conference (1981), proposed regulations,
temporary regulations, public outcry, repeated extensions of deadlines, reproposed regula-
tions, and recurring press releases. For the legislative history, see H.R. Rep. No. 1150, Part
I, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1980); H.R. REP. No. 1479, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 186 (1980) (confer-
ence report); Cong. Rec., § 8472 (daily ed. July 24, 1980); H.R. REP. No. 215, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. 274 (1981) (conference report).
2 Under the information reporting scheme, payors of wages and interest in the aggregate
of $10 or more to any one recipient were required to file an annual return listing recipients
and the amounts paid. I.R.C. § 6049 (CCH 1985).
22 Section 129 of H.R. 4170, the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, adds I.R.C. § 1445. The
Senate previously passed a similar withholding tax provision in (1) the original FIRPTA, (2)
the Economic Recovery Act of 1981, and (3) the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of
1982.
The new FIRPTA withholding requirements impose a 10% withholding tax on gains real-
ized on the disposition of USRPI. These requirements potentially affect all real estate clos-
ings, sales of non-publicly traded corporate stock, and sales of certain partnership, trust,
and estate interests. Tax Reform Act of 1984, § 129 (amending I.R.C. § 6039(c) and adding §
1445).
For an exhaustive but practical explanation of the new withholding requirements, see
Hudson, Analysis of the New FIRPTA Withholding Requirements, 24 TAx NoTEs 573 (Aug.
6, 1984).
22 Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 98-67, 97 Stat. 384 (1983).
24 Those countries include the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Cayman Islands, Costa Rica,
Dominican Republic, the Eastern Caribbean (Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, British Virgin
Islands, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, Saint Christopher News, Saint Lucia, Saint Vin-
cent, and the Grenadines), El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica,
Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua, Panama, Surinam, Trinidad and Tobago, and the Turks
and Caicos Islands.
"' See H.R. REP. No. 666, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1982), which describes the region's ship-
ping lanes as vital to the United States' defense and prosperity, and emphasizes that two-
thirds of all oil imported by the United States, half of United States trade, and many strate-
gic minerals pass through the Panama Canal and the Gulf of Mexico.
26 All products except textiles, apparel, footwear, handbags, luggage, work gloves, tuna,
petroleum, and watches or watch parts are to receive duty free treatment until 1995. Carib-
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trade,27 and affords direct financial assistance to these countries.28
To benefit from the CBI, however, a country must first enter a
bilateral exchange of information agreement with the United
States. 9 Under such an agreement, the developing country must
provide the United States with any available information that
could assist the United States in enforcing its tax laws.3 0 These
agreements, therefore, present a conflict of allegiances for tax
havens such as the Netherlands Antilles. In short, these countries
must choose between benefiting from trade alliances with the
United States and protecting the identity of third party nationals
who benefit from tax treaties between the tax haven country and
the United States.3 1 The Netherlands Antilles faced just such a di-
lemma in the recent renegotiation of its current treaty with the
United States. 2 The Antilles' reluctance to include exchange of in-
formation provisions in the renegotiated treaty33 was a major
stumbling block delaying a bilateral agreement.
The current tax treaty between the United States and the
Netherlands Antilles is an extension of the Income Tax Conven-
tion (Convention) between the United States and the Kingdom of
bean Basin Economic Recovery Act, §§ 213, 218, 97 Stat. at 395.
21 The CBI distributes all excise taxes collected on rum imported into the United States
to Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. Id. § 221, 97 Stat. at 395.
28 In keeping with this objective, Congress has approved at least $350 million in supple-
mental aid for the region. See supra note 25.
29 Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, § 222(a)(6)(c).
30 Information available to the United States includes information which might otherwise
be subject to Antillean non-disclosure laws, such as provisions relating to bank secrecy and
bearer shares. Id.
3' Field, Treasury Spells Out New Caribbean Tax Incentives, 14 TAX NOTES 775 (Mar.
22, 1982). These third-party nationals are commonly referred to as "treaty shoppers" be-
cause they actively seek to benefit from other countries' tax treaties with the United States.
The United States loses more than $1 billion a year in tax revenues to treaty shoppers
because Antillean secrecy laws shield their identity from the I.R.S. Letter from Representa-
tive Doug Barnard to Treasury Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy John E. Chapoton (Feb.
2, 1984), reprinted in 23 TAX NOTES 739, 740 (Feb. 20, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Barnard
Letter].
32 The United States Treasury Department announced reconsideration of the treaty in
1979. Announcement 79-117, 1979-35 I.R.B. 19. Actual renegotiation, however, did not com-
mence until October, 1982.
3 Only recently had the Netherlands Antilles changed its position. By modifying its bank
secrecy and bearer share laws, and accepting extensive policing and enforcement provisions,
the Antilles may have conceded to the farthest reaching and most effective information ex-
change provisions ever contained in a United States tax treaty. The Netherlands Antilles
Makes Major Concessions in the Treaty Negotiations, 12 TAX MGMT. INT'L J. 161
(1984)(citing letter from Dr. D.F. Martina, Minister of the Netherlands Antilles, to Vice
President Bush).
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
the Netherlands. 34 The treaty was drafted shortly after World War
II, during a period in which the United States dominated economic
relations with the European Netherlands. Despite the unequal bar-
gaining positions of the two countries, the United States responded
to the Antilles' need to attract foreign capital by using the Conven-
tion to grant United States citizens tax incentives to invest in the
Antilles. 5 In 1963, however, the United States and the Nether-
lands Antilles negotiated a Protocol to the Convention (Protocol) 6
in response to criticism that the Convention and the Antilles tax
code provided too many tax benefits.37 Nevertheless, the Conven-
tion and its Protocol effectively eliminated any tax burdens associ-
ated with investing in United States corporations through Antil-
lean subsidiaries. For example, under article VIII of the
Convention, interest on indebtedness derived from United States
sources by a resident or corporation of the Netherlands Antilles is
tax free." Under article VII, the rate of United States tax on divi-
dends derived from a United States source by an Antillean resi-
dent or corporation is limited to fifteen percent.3 9 Furthermore,
most financing subsidiaries pay a reduced tax on their net income
of only 2.4% to 3.0%.4o
The 1984 Act effectively negates these provisions, however, by
removing the major incentive for utilizing Antillean subsidiaries.
Section 127 of the Act repealed the thirty percent withholding tax
imposed by the United States on portfolio indebtedness of United
States borrowers to nonresident aliens and foreign corporations, ef-
fective July 18, 1984. The repeal applies to interest paid on two
"' See Convention, supra note 8.
3 Recent Development, Taxation-Renegotiation of the United States-Netherlands An-
tilles Tax Treaty, 18 TEX. INT'L L.J. 400, 402 (1983).
31 Protocol Modifying and Supplementing of the Convention of Apr. 29, 1948, Oct. 23,
1963, United States-Netherlands, 15 U.S.T. 1900, T.I.A.S. No. 5665.
11 Specifically, several Latin American states complained that many of their nationals
were investing scarce capital in the United States via Antilles corporations. Recent Develop-
ment, Taxation: Renegotiation of the United States-Netherlands Antilles Tax Convention,
23 HARV. INT'L L.J. 472, 474 (1983).
3 There is one exception to this provision: if an Antilles corporation controls more than
50% of a United States corporation's stock, the subsidiary pays the normal United States
income tax of 30%. Convention, supra note 8, art. VIII; see Recent Development, supra
note 37, at 475.
11 If, however, the Antillean corporation directly or indirectly controls at least 95% of the
voting power in the United States corporation, the rate falls to five percent. Convention,
supra note 8, art. VII, § 1.
40 The normal rate of corporate tax in the Antilles ranges from 27% to 35%. Margolis,
supra note 7, at 49; Convention, supra note 8, art. XI.
" Although a proposed Senate amendment phased out the tax over a four-year period,
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groups of obligations. First, no interest will be withheld on unregis-
tered, "bearer" obligations which meet three requirements: (1)
those designed to be originally issued only to foreign persons; (2)
those on which the interest is payable only outside the United
States; and (3) those which contain a statement on their face warn-
ing that any United States holder will be subject to United States
tax.2 Second, the repeal applies when the United States person,4"
who would otherwise be required to withhold tax from the interest
on the obligation, has received a verified statement that the benefi-
cial owner of the obligation is not a United States person." This
statement must be made either by the beneficial owner or by a
securities clearing organization, or other financial institution that
holds customers' securities in the ordinary course of its business."5
Several other portions of the repeal are also signficant. The tax
on interest received by foreign corporations was repealed in the
same manner as the tax on income received by nonresident alien
individuals.'6 In addition, the Act exempts certain obligations of
nonresident aliens from United States estate taxes.47 The with-
the conference agreement repeals the tax with respect to interest paid on obligations en-
tered into after July 18, 1984.
42 I.R.C. §§ 871(h)(2)(A), 163(f)(2)(B) (CCH 1984). Meeting these criteria also exempts
the obligation from registration requirements imposed by the Tax Equity and Fiscal Re-
sponsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982).
"8 The term "United States person" refers to citizens and residents of the United States,
domestic partnerships and corporations, and any estate or trust (other than a foreign estate
or trust as defined in I.R.C. § 7701(a)(31)). I.R.C. § 7701(a)(30) (CCH 1985).
" I.R.C. § 871(h)(2)(B) (CCH 1984).
45 Such statements are ineffective, however, if at least one month before the payment of
interest on the applicable obligation, the Secretary of the Treasury publishes a determina-
tion that any statement from such person(s) is ineffective. I.R.C. § 871(h)(4) (CCH 1984).
The Secretary further has the authority to withdraw the withholding exemption of countries
from which the United States is receiving inadequate information to prevent evasion of fed-
eral taxes by United States persons. Id. § 871(h)(5) (CCH 1984).
" See Tax Reform Act of 1984, § 127(b) (redesignating I.R.C. § 881(c)). The Act includes
special rules for controlled foreign corporations (CFCs). See id. § 127(c)(4). Payments of
interest on a United States affiliate's obligation to an applicable CFC are treated as pay-
ments to a resident of the country in which the applicable CFC is incorporated. The terms
"applicable CFC" and "United States affiliate obligation" generally have the same meaning
as under I.R.C. §§ 131(b)(2)(D) and 131(b)(2)(F), respectively. Id. §§ 127(g)(2)(A), 127
(g)(2)(c) (CCH 1984).
" Obligations exempted include: (1) amounts described in I.R.C. § 861(c)-generally, de-
posits with banks and insurance companies, the interest on which would be treated as in-
come from non-United States sources if the decedent had received it before his death; (2)
deposits with foreign branches of domestic corporations or partnerships engaged in the com-
mercial banking business; and (3) obligations which would be exempt from the 30% with-
holding tax had the decedent received it before his death. I.R.C. § 127(d) (CCH 1984)
(amending I.R.C. § 2105).
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holding tax remains applicable, however, to interest paid on bearer
and registered obligations owned by "ten-percent" shareholders."'
For several years the sale of United States corporate bonds
through Antillean affiliates has strengthened foreign capital mar-
kets, particularly the Eurobond market. The effect has been espe-
cially distressing to the New York financial industry. 9 From 1980
to 1982, the proportion of the world's capital sales comprised of
Eurobonds and foreign bond issues"0 increased from 47 % to 61% .1
Any revitalization in the New York capital market which might
result from the 1984 repeal, however, would only serve to further
weaken the United States' relations with the Netherlands Antil-
les.52 Throughout congressional debates over the 1984 Act, the An-
tilles forcefully advocated that a repeal of the withholding tax
would wreak havoc on its economy,53 and cause the islands to sur-
render to communism. 54 In light of these objections, the 1984 re-
peal indicates either that Congress is more immediately concerned
with financing its national debt than securing its southern bor-
der,5 5 or that it simply discounts such threats as "diplomatic
'8 A "ten-percent" shareholder is any person who owns 10% or more of the total com-
bined voting power of all classes of voting stock, or in the case of a partnership, 10% of the
capital or profits. I.R.C. § 871(h)(3) (CCH 1984). Stock ownership is determined according
to § 871(h)(3)(C).
4, For the first time since World War II, foreign capital markets have become more im-
portant to United States corporations than New York. Francis, supra note 5.
Foreign bond issues are underwritten by institutions from a country other than the
United States, denominated in the currency of that country (unlike Eurobonds which are
denominated in dollars), and sold in that country.
" In 1982, $69.7 billion in bonds were sold in the Eurobond and foreign currency mar-
kets; $43.7 billion were sold in the domestic public market. This recent emphasis on Euro-
financing has created thousands of investment banking positions in London, some of which
may now return to New York as a result of the withholding tax repeal. Francis, supra note
5; see generally Sheppard, Tax Reform Act Permits Eurobond Investors to Buy from New
York, 24 TAx NoTs 6 (July 2, 1984).
5 Revitalization of the New York market should also strain relations with United States
allies who suffer from economies weaker than that of the United States. Many foreign bank-
ers already think the United States drains too much capital from the rest of the world.
Wash. Post, supra note 7, at col. 2.
0' Hamilton, supra note 6, at col. 3. Investment activities on the islands provide 17% of
foreign exchange earnings, 7% of employment, and almost one-third ($50 million) of annual
tax revenues. Fialka, supra note 9, at 1, col. 6; Francis, supra note 5.
Antillean representatives in Washington have reportedly argued that the 1984 repeal
makes the islands an easy target for communist aggression from Cuba. Hamilton, supra note
6, at 5, col. 2; see also supra note 16 (warning by Harold Henriquez of a possible overthrow
by groups with "leftist sympathies"); supra note 33 and accompanying text.
11 In passing the Caribbean Basin Initiative, Congress recognized the Caribbean as strate-
gic to the defense of the United States. See supra note 25. As a result, some observers view




From the United States' standpoint, one of the most desirable
effects of the repeal will be a long-range reduction in the cost of
corporate and Treasury borrowing.5 7 At present, however, this ob-
jective may be more illusory than real. The Public Securities Asso-
ciation has predicted that a repeal of the withholding tax may in
fact narrow the spread between the cost of United States-source
issues in the Eurobond market and similar foreign-source issues.5 8
Should this narrowing be the result of an increase in Eurobond
rates, much of the corporate savings realized from bypassing fi-
nancing subsidiaries in the Antilles will be eroded, negating the
major incentive behind the repeal. Corporate Eurobond offerings
made since the repeal, however, have realized savings comparable
to those formerly realized only through Antillean channels.5 9 In
spite of this immediate reaction to the repeal, much of the Trea-
sury's savings may in the long run come from an overall relaxing of
pressure on the domestic capital market rather than an immediate
drop in the cost of borrowing. This relaxation should occur even
though a number of foreign investors find security more enticing
than a high return on their investment, and accept the lower yield
traditionally offered by more stable United States issues. 1
Another benefit of the Tax Reform Act accruing to United
States corporations will be a shift from short-term to long-term
investments,62 further increasing opportunities to raise capital.
supra note 5, at 5-6; Hamilton, supra note 6, at col. 3 (quoting Harold Henriquez).
See Francis, supra note 5, at 6, col. 2.
67 By borrowing directly on the Eurobond market, American corporations should save
even more than the $100 million they have saved already by channeling loans through fi-
nancing subsidiaries in the Antilles. See id. at 5, col. 3.
58 Letter from Jack Runnion, Jr., Chairman of the Public Securities Association's Com-
mittee on Government and Federal Agencies Securities, to Beryl W. Sprinkel, Under Secre-
tary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs (July 11, 1984), reprinted in 24 TAx NoTEs 431
(July 30, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Runnion Letter].
" For example, Coca-Cola saved almost one percent on its Eurobond offering compared
to the cost of domestic capital. Sheppard, Treasury Reassures Foreign Investors But Not
Congress About Targeted Issue, 24 TAX NoTEs 1103, 1104-05 (Sept. 17, 1984) [hereinafter
cited as Sheppard, Targeted Issues].
40 Id. at 1104.
*1 Sheppard, supra note 51, at 7; see also Recent Development, supra note 35, at 405;
Letter from Bob Dole, Senate Finance Committee Chairman, to Secretary of the Treasury
Donald T. Regan (July 16, 1984), reprinted in 24 TAX NOTES 430 (July 30, 1984)(emphasiz-
ing that United States Treasury obligations are among the most secure in the world) [here-
inafter cited as Dole Letter].
6 Although the value of the dollar rose in Europe and Asia upon passage of the Act,
analysts expect only a change in the way the dollar market operates, not a permanent shift
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This transition should occur since the Internal Revenue Code im-
poses no withholding tax on interest paid to foreigners on short-
term investments. 3 As a result, foreign investors have historically
found short-term financing more attractive than long-term invest-
ments. The repeal, however, allows investors to earn the higher re-
turns which often accompany long-term investments without being
subject to withholding, and therefore should cause a reversal in in-
vestors' preference for short-term instruments."4
Despite these benefits, the Treasury continues to find itself in a
dilemma. Its "financial conscience" wants to issue unregistered
bearer bonds to encourage foreign financing of the national debt at
rates lower than the Treasury paid before the repeal; at the same
time, its "tax conscience" wants to prevent tax evasion by United
States persons masquerading as foreigners. 5 In an effort to resolve
both concerns, the Treasury authorized the offering of "targeted
issues" by corporate borrowers." Under a targeted issue, registered
book-entry bonds are sold to United States persons, while unregis-
tered bearer instruments are "targeted" to investors abroad. 7
Targeted issues give the Treasury some control over the amount of
obligations held by foreigners in comparison to Americans." In ad-
dition, targeted issues could yield a lower return to foreigners en-
ticed by the security of United States issues.6 9 From a corporate
standpoint, targeted issues provide the desired access to cheaper
foreign capital, while avoiding the appearance of domestic tax eva-
sion. Realistically, however, targeted issues do not conclusively
prevent American taxpayers from securing bearer bonds abroad
and repatriating them. In fact, those taxpayers intent on evading
the tax on interest could simply retain their bonds in portfolios
in the dollar's value. Sheppard, supra note 51, at 7.
-s I.R.C. § 861 (CCH 1984) includes a set of statutory rules for determining what consti-
tutes United States-source income. Certain items of gross income are considered wholly de-
rived from United States sources, while other items are apportioned. In both cases, deduc-
tions from gross income are allowed to determine total taxable income from United States
sources.
See Sheppard, supra note 51, at 7.
Sheppard, The United States as a Tax Haven, 24 TAx NoTEs 325 (July 23, 1984)
[hereinafter cited as Sheppard, Tax Haven].
6 See supra notes 42 and 44 and accompanying text.
" Book-entry bonds require registration of the bond-holder before redemption; bearer
bonds can be redeemed anonymously by whoever possesses them. In an effort to prevent
abuse, foreign underwriters would be required to certify that no bearer-instrument pur-
chaser is a United States person. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
68 Sheppard, supra note 51, at 7.




The use of bearer bonds in a targeted issue also raises a proprie-
tary question because it encourages the anonymity of foreigners,
while requiring registration of United States investors.71 In light of
this potential inequity, the Public Securities Association over-
whelmingly recommended that all bearer securities be prohibited.72
The Treasury, at least with respect to its own issues, may have
agreed with the Association; it announced on September 7, 1984,
that no United States government-backed securities will be issued
in bearer form. 73 Nevertheless, allowing corporate issues of bearer
instruments indicates that the Treasury recognizes the predomi-
nantly bearer-oriented nature of the Eurobond market.74
In light of this recognition, the Treasury's targeted security fea-
tures traits which are more familiar to foreign investors, but which
do not sacrifice the Treasury's concerns about domestic tax eva-
sion. Although registered through the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York, the Treasury's security offers an annual coupon similar
to most Euro-financing instruments, rather than the semiannual
coupon favored in the United States. The security will also be of-
fered by public auction at the same time as domestic Treasury se-
curities. Due to the Treasury's compliance concerns, however, only
foreigners, or foreign offices of United States financial institutions,
may initially purchase the security. In addition, the Treasury se-
curity cannot be resold to United States persons, other than for-
eign branches of United States financial institutions, until forty-
70 Representative Doug Barnard has raised serious doubts about the efficiency of regula-
tions designed to prevent United States citizens from posing as foreigners, and the efficacy
of the present "self-certification" system: "A tax evader has probably committed a felony
already, so the possibility of perjuring himself in self-certification isn't going to stop him."
Letter to Treasury Secretary Donald T. Regan and I.R.S. Commissioner Roscoe L. Eggar,
Jr. (July 11, 1984), quoted in Sheppard, Tax Haven, supra note 65, at 326.
Other criticisms of targeted issues exist as well. First, it is unlikely that the Treasury
could reimpose registration requirements once the practice of issuing bearer debt is initiated
due to investor, corporate, and Treasury reliance on such financing. Dole Letter, supra note
61. Second, the resulting interest savings could easily be negated by the combination of a
switch from short-term to long-term Treasury bills and even a slight increase in Treasury
bill rates. Runnion Letter, supra note 58, at 432.
"' This concern is shared by Senator Bob Dole: "A perceived collusion by the U.S. Trea-
sury with tax evaders is of even greater concern to me than a similar potential use of private
U.S. corporate securities by such persons." Dole Letter, supra note 61; see Runnion Letter,
supra note 58.
71 See Runnion Letter, supra note 58, at 432.
71 Treasury News, 24 TAX NoTEs 338 (July 23, 1984); Sheppard, Targeted Issues, supra
note 59, at 1103.
71 Treasury News, 24 TAX NoTEs 1107 (Sept. 17, 1984).
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five days after original issuance.75 Ultimately, however, the Trea-
sury must await the passage of time before it can ascertain
whether its security truly strikes an effective balance between
preventing domestic tax evasion and facilitating domestic access to
international capital.76
An alternative to targeted issues might be the implementation of
a withholding tax at a very low rate. This strategy would assuage
both the Treasury's compliance and trade concerns. Interest in-
come would be reported by payors, and the value of the dollar
would stabilize lower than under total repeal of withholding be-
cause only an incremental number of foreign investors who de-
mand complete anonymity would invest elsewhere. 7 Fortunately
for United States corporations, however, Congress chose a course
of total repeal, freeing American corporations to sell debt in the
same tax-free manner as their counterparts overseas.78
As the repeal takes effect, American corporations should fully
utilize their new access to cheaper Euro-financing. 79 As a result,
Antillean financing subsidiaries will be deemed unprofitable, and
will silently fade in the name of fiscal efficiency. In addition, the
Treasury will demand its share of the market in its continuing ef-
fort to finance the staggering deficit.80 In fact, as the Treasury's
share of the bond market expands American corporations and the
Treasury may eventually find themselves in competition with each
other, eliminating all savings realized from the 1984 repeal.
In addition, the Netherlands Antilles will feel the weakening of
its tax haven status as a result of the repeal, but not to the devas-
tating extent it sought Congress to believe.8' In the last thirty
years, the Netherlands Antilles has earned billions of dollars with
limited resources. By focusing this creativity on circumventing the
effects of the repeal, the islands should remain a leading center of
international finance. Through capitalizing on its strong ties with
the United States and the Netherlands, in conjunction with its
convenient position in the Caribbean, the Antilles could perhaps
75 Information Concerning Issue by U.S. Treasury Department of Registered Securities
Targeted to Foreigners, TREAS. DEP'T REP. (Sept. 10, 1984), excerpted in 24 TAX NOTES
1110-11 (Sept. 17, 1984).
76 See id. at 1107.
17 Sheppard, Tax Haven, supra note 65, at 327.
78 See Barnard Letter, supra note 31.
79 Sheppard, supra note 51, at 7.
80 See Hamilton, supra note 6.
"1 See supra notes 53, 54 and accompanying text.
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supplant Panama as the center of Central American finance. 2 In
any event, the 1984 repeal indicates that the United States has ef-
fectively renounced its treaty with the Antilles, partially under-
mining the favorable initiatives made toward the Caribbean in the
CBI. Additionally, Treasury and corporate borrowers have gained
access to cheaper capital, but not without increasing their depen-
dence on volatile international markets.
Lee C. Dilworth
82 See Recent Development, supra note 35, at 407.
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